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Modeling Option and Strategy Choices with Connectionist Networks: 








We claim that understanding human decisions requires that both automatic and deliberate proc-
esses be considered. First, we sketch the qualitative differences between two hypothetical proc-
essing systems, an automatic and a deliberate system. Second, we show the potential that con-
nectionism offers for modeling processes of decision making and discuss some empirical evi-
dence. Specifically, we posit that the integration of information and the application of a selection 
rule are governed by the automatic system. The deliberate system is assumed to be responsible 
for information search, inferences and the modification of the network that the automatic proc-
esses act on. Third, we critically evaluate the multiple-strategy approach to decision making. We 
introduce the basic assumption of an integrative approach stating that individuals apply an all-
purpose rule for decisions but use different strategies for information search. Fourth, we develop 
a connectionist framework that explains the interaction between automatic and deliberate proc-
esses and is able to account for choices both at the option and at the strategy level. 
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Automatic and Deliberate Processes in Decision Making 
Many cognitive operations function without or even in opposition to deliberate control. Text-
books in psychology provide a plethora of empirical findings giving evidence for the power of 
the automatic system. Prominent examples are perceptual illusions of object size (e.g., moon  
illusion), interferences between mental tasks (e.g., the Stroop effect) or counter-intentional be-
havior (e.g., relapse errors). Aside from these negative effects, we have to appreciate that a great 
deal of adaptive learning would be impossible without the service of the automatic system. Or-
ganisms automatically record fundamental aspects of the empirical world such as the frequency 
(e.g., Hasher & Zacks, 1984; Sedlmeier & Betsch, 2002) and the value of events (e.g., Betsch, 
Plessner et al., 2001). Implicit knowledge of these variables systematically informs subsequent 
behavior. The vast literature on animal choice (e.g., Davis et al., 1993) suggests that behavioral 
decisions can be made even by species that are probably not capable of making rational, rea-
soned or planned decisions. 
The automatic mode of information processing is usually contrasted with a deliberate mode. 
Kahneman and Frederick (2002) have summarized several dual-process models in a general two-
systems framework (for a classic dual processing approach see Schneider & Shiffrin, 1977; Shif-
frin & Schneider, 1977; for a different perspective see Hammond, Hamm, Grassia, & Pearson, 
1987). System 1 is based on intuitive, automatic processing. Information is processed rather rap-
idly and in parallel; processing is associative, effortless and opaque to the decision maker. In 
contrast, system 2 is based on reflective, deliberate processing in which information is processed 
in a controlled fashion and step-by-step. Processing involves deductive reasoning and is effortful 
(see Betsch, 2007, for a discussion). 
By virtue of its historical embedding, decision making has been widely considered a matter of 
reason and control (Dawes, 1998) and, thus, neglected automatic processes for a long time. A 
rational decision maker – the homo oeconomicus – consciously anticipates consequences, evalu-
ates risks and values, and eventually decides after a careful analysis of expected utility. These 
deliberate operations are costly because they consume cognitive and task-related resources (e.g., 
time, money). Herbert Simon was among the first to identify the boundaries of the deliberate 
system. He doubted whether humans are able to perform the complex operations of evaluation 
and information integration prescribed by the rational model of choice (Simon, 1955; 1982). Ac-
cording to his bounded rationality approach, decision makers use simple strategies that reduce 
the amount of information and the number of cognitive operations. Following Simon's work, 
psychologists identified a number of such strategies or heuristics that provide shortcuts to delib-
eration (e.g., Beach & Mitchell, 1978; Gigerenzer, Todd, & the ABC Research Group, 1999; 
Gigerenzer, 2004; Payne, 1982; Payne, Bettman, & Johnson, 1993). Amongst the many rules, 
one can find very simple strategies such as the lexicographic rule (LEX, Fishburn, 1974) that 
only considers information on the most important attribute. There are also more complex ones, 
such as the equal-weight strategy (EQW, e.g., Payne, Bettman & Johnson, 1988) that integrates 
values within options but neglects differences in importance or probability (see below for a more 
thorough discussion).  3 
The majority of decision strategies described in the literature involve conscious consideration of 
given information. As such they are deliberate heuristics and are silent about the potentials of the 
automatic system (Frederick, 2002). Over half a century ago, however, Herbert Simon already 
anticipated its powers: "My first empirical proposition is that there is a complete lack of evi-
dence that, in actual choice situations of any complexity, these [rational] computations can be, or 
are in fact, performed... but we cannot, of course, rule out the possibility that the un-conscious is 
a better decision maker than the conscious" (Simon, 1955, p. 104; italics added).  
Yet, it took the field of decision research a couple of decades until automatic processes were sys-
tematically considered at the theoretical level. This development coincided with the increasing 
interest that researchers devoted to memory processes in decision making (Weber, Goldstein & 
Busemeyer, 1991). Accordingly, a number of different models emerged assuming that automatic 
processes of recognition, affect generation and activation of prior knowledge play a central role 
in behavioral choice (Damasio, 1994; Dougherty et al., 1999; Haidt, 2001; Hogarth, 2001; Klein, 
1993, 1999; Lieberman, 2000; Slovic et al., 2002). For example, decisions by experienced actors 
may often be based on recognition of a situation and identification of learned behavioral rules 
(Klein, 1999). These processes are primarily performed by the automatic system and involve 
quick and simultaneous consideration of multiple pieces of information. Memory processes are 
also involved in affect-based decision making (e.g., Slovic e al., 2002). Via feedback learning, 
behavioral options and their consequences can be associated in memory with affective responses. 
As a consequence, encountering the behavior in the future entails spontaneous activation of af-
fective reactions reflecting past experience. As such, decisions made by relying on affective re-
sponses are also guided by automatic processes, at least during the initial steps when affective 
reactions are generated vis-à-vis the given information.   
The automatic system may not only guide operations of recognition, affect generation and acti-
vation of behavioral knowledge from memory. It may also direct subsequent processes that per-
tain to information integration and choice. Consistency maximizing models assume that not only 
memory operations but also processes of information integration and choice may be performed 
by the automatic system (Betsch, 2005; Glöckner, 2006; Holyoak & Simon, 1999; Simon & 
Holyoak, 2002; Simon, 2004). The model to be presented below advances the consistency 
maximizing approach within a connectionist framework. We first outline the basic idea behind 
this approach and thereafter delineate our computational model. 
A Connectionist Approach to Decision Making 
One of the basic ideas of Gestalt psychology (e.g., Köhler, 1947) is that the cognitive system 
tends automatically to minimize inconsistency between given piece of information in order to 
make sense of the world and to form consistent mental representations ("Gestalten"). By holistic 
processing, a preferred interpretation of a constellation of information is automatically identified, 
and information is modified to fit this interpretation (cf., Read et al., 1997). Prominent demon-
strations of these mechanisms are images with changing figure/ground relationships like the 4 
"Rubinian vase" (Rubin, 1915/1921) in which automatic consistency maximizing processes pro-
duce either the perception of a vase or the perception of two faces. Note that both of these quali-
tatively different conscious perceptions are based on – obviously automatically produced – inter-
pretations of the same objective information. The subjective interpretation of each piece of in-
formation is actively modified to fit the former or the latter consistent mental representation. 
Consistency maximizing theories also have a long tradition in social psychology (Heider, 1946; 
Festinger, 1957; for an overview see Simon & Holyoak, 2002), and their predictions concerning 
social cognition and interaction have been supported by ample evidence (e.g., Wicklund & 
Brehm, 1976).  
With the introduction of connectionist theories and particular parallel constraint satisfaction net-
work models (e.g., Rumelhart & McClelland, 1986; Thagard, 1989), it became possible to extend 
the idea of consistency maximizing from simple dyadic or triadic constellations to more complex 
constellations of information (Read et al., 1997). Such complex constellations can be represented 
in symbolic networks (i.e., networks in which meaning is not completely distributed among 
nodes). An iterative updating algorithm can be used to simulate consistency maximizing by 
spreading activation. Such parallel constraint satisfaction (PCS) network models have been suc-
cessfully applied to explain processes of letter and word perception (McClelland & Rumelhart, 
1981), social perception (Read & Miller, 1998), analogical mapping (Holyoak & Thagard, 1989), 
the evaluation of explanations (Thagard, 1989), dissonance reduction (Shultz & Lepper, 1996), 
impression formation (Kunda & Thagard, 1996), the selection of plans (Thagard & Millgram, 
1995), legal decision making (Holyoak & Simon, 1999; Simon, 2004), preferential choice 
(Simon et al., 2004) and probabilistic decisions (Glöckner, 2006; Glöckner, 2007; Glöckner & 
Betsch, 2007).  
The potentials of the connectionist approach for modeling decisions have been repeatedly high-
lighted. Thagard and colleagues have demonstrated convincingly that a strategic selection of 
plans (Thagard & Millgram, 1995), as well as jury decisions (Thagard, 2003), could be plausibly 
simulated by employing a parallel constraint satisfaction (PCS) network. Furthermore, Holyoak, 
Simon and colleagues (Holyoak & Simon, 1999; Simon, Krawczyk, & Holyoak, 2004; Simon, 
Snow & Read, 2004) showed that individuals tend to increase coherence even while the decision 
is made. Note that such coherence shifts cannot be explained by either rational choice models or 
simple heuristics, which share the assumption that stimulus information remains stable during 
subsequent decision processes once it is represented in the mind (Brownstein, 2003; Glöckner, 
Betsch, & Schindler, 2007). Dan Simon (2004) summarized his findings concerning the consis-
tency maximizing mechanism in (legal) decision making as follows: (1) with the emergence of 
the decision task, the mental representation of the task shifts towards a state of internal consis-
tency (coherence shifts): the information that supports the emerging decision is accepted, and the 
information that supports the alternative is devalued or ignored; (2) people are not aware of these 
coherence shifts, and the ensuing decision is "experienced as rationally warranted by the inherent 
values of the variables, rather than by an inflated perception imposed by the cognitive system" 
(Simon, 2004, p. 545); (3) these coherence shifts, which are caused by consistency maximizing 5 
processes, "play an operative role in the decision process" (p. 546); (4) consistency maximizing 
processes influence information directly involved in the decision, as well as beliefs and back-
ground knowledge; (5) changes in one aspect of the mental model may trigger changes in other 
information throughout the model because pieces of information are interdependent; (6) motiva-
tion and attitudes can influence the direction of coherence shifts; (7) coherence shifts caused by 
consistency maximizing processes are of a transitory nature since they are produced to solve the 
decision task at hand, but usually disappear after a certain time; (8) deliberate instructions to 
consider the opposite position reduce the size of coherence shifts. 
Taken as a whole, these findings support the notion that automatic consistency maximizing proc-
esses are a general mechanism in human cognition that help people make sense of information 
by actively structuring it. As reported by Simon (2004), people are not aware of the underlying 
processes, but they are certainly aware of the results, namely, the resulting consistent mental rep-
resentation. In line with this work, we propose that consistency maximizing processes play an 
operative role in decision making and are not only an epiphenomenon or post-decisional ration-
alization (Simon & Holyoak, 2002).  
We go one step further and state that automatic consistency maximizing processes are the core 
information integration process in decision making, and assume that a sufficient level of consis-
tency is a precondition for terminating the decision process. A consistent representation can be 
reached mainly by modifying information so that one option clearly dominates the others (for 
similar approaches, see Montgomery, 1989; Svenson, 1992). Processes of consistency maximiz-
ing always automatically operate to foster such consistent mental representations. Because they 
are automatic, they cannot be simply turned off (Bargh & Chartrand, 1999). We argue that the 
direction of dominance structuring is determined by the initial structure of information. Simply 
stated, dominance structuring operates in favor of the option which is initially supported by the 
strongest evidence, and the process automatically accentuates this advantage. It is not necessary 
that the individual has a (conscious) initial preference. The automatic system determines the best 
candidate; it accentuates its initial advantages and the individual finally becomes aware of the 
dominant option (i.e., the one producing the most coherent mental representation in the context 
of all other pieces of information considered). Such a model could – for instance – explain the 
finding that even lower animals like sticklebacks select mating partners by integrating trait in-
formation in a complex compensatory strategy (Künzler & Bakker, 2001).   
In contrast to lower animals, humans have developed the ability to supervise and deliberately 
affect these automatic processes (Betsch, 2005). Although the computational power of the delib-
erate system is limited, it is important for providing further information to the network. By modi-
fying the network of considered information, it allows for fast adaptations to changes in the envi-
ronment. We will consider the interaction of deliberate and automatic processes in the next sec-
tion. In the remainder of this section, we briefly outline the computational model and close with 
a short review of empirical evidence. 6 
Specifically, we developed a parallel constraint satisfaction (PCS) network model for probabilis-
tic decision tasks (i.e., decisions based on probability cues). The PCS model proposes that prob-
abilistic decision tasks can be represented in a simple network structure (Figure 1). Cues and 
options are nodes in the network. Logical relations are represented by inhibitory or excitatory 
links between these nodes. All links are bidirectional, which means that cues not only facilitate 
(or inhibit) options, but also vice versa. The strength of the relation between nodes is represented 
by weights, which can vary from -1.0 to 1.0. Excitatory (inhibitory) links between cues and op-
tions represent positive (negative) prediction of cues for options. Strong inhibitory links between 
options reflect the fact that only one option can be chosen. The general validity node activates 
the network and has a constant activation of 1. The strength of the excitatory links between the 
general validity node and the cues indicate the initial validity of the cues. The spread of activa-
tion in the network is simulated by an iterative updating function that maximizes consistency 
under the given constraints.  
We use a sigmoid activation function to simulate spreading activation in the network 
(McClelland & Rumelhart, 1981; Rumelhart & McClelland, 1982; Rumelhart, Hinton, & 
McClelland, 1986). The algorithm maximizes consistency and, after a certain number of itera-
tions, leads to a balanced state in which activations stop changing. All nodes start at an activation 
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in which ai(t) is the current activation of the node i, which is multiplied by a decay factor. The 
resulting product is increased or decreased by the incoming activation for the node inputi(t), 
which is multiplied with a scaling factor. If the incoming activation for the node is negative, the 
incoming activation is multiplied by the current activation of the node minus the minimum acti-
vation value floor. If the incoming activation for the node is positive, it is multiplied by the 
maximum activation value ceiling minus the current activation of the node. The incoming activa-
tion for each node is computed by the weighted sum of the links (i.e., connection weights) be-
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with wij being the strength of the link between the focus node i and any connected node j and 
aj(t) being the current activation of node j. In our simulations we use a maximum node activation 
of ceiling = 1 and a minimum node activation of floor = -1. The decay parameter is usually set to 
0.05. 
According to the updating function, activations of nodes are modified until a stable solution of 
the network is found that represents the state of maximized consistency (McClelland & Rumel-
hart, 1981; Read et al., 1997). In the process the activation level of the nodes that represent op-7 
tions and cues is jointly modified according to the underlying structure of interdependencies. In 
the stable state, one option will usually dominate the other options and will be highly activated. 
Cues that support this option will be highly activated, too, whereas cues that oppose this option 
will have a lower level of activation. 
 
Figure 1. General parallel constraint satisfaction network for the simulation of  
probabilistic decisions  
 
We postulate that the model captures the essential automatic consistency maximizing process in 
decision making based on probability cues. In a series of studies (Glöckner, 2006; Glöckner & 
Betsch, 2007) which were designed to test the PCS rule against fast-and-frugal heuristics (Giger-
enzer et al., 1999), participants worked on probabilistic decision tasks. In the city-size task, for 
example, individuals decide which of two cities is larger based on a set of probabilistic cues 
(e.g., is the city a state capital or not?). The cues are predictive for the decision criterion (i.e., city 
size). The complexity of the decision tasks was varied within and between studies by using either 
three (Figure 2, right) or six cues (Figure 2, left). Information was presented in an open informa-
tion matrix; no information about cue validity was provided and participants were instructed to 
make good decisions and to proceed as quickly as possible. Choices, decision times and in some 
of the studies confidence judgments were recorded as dependent variables. 
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  City A  City B 
State Capital      +      − 
University      +      + 
1
st League Soccer Team  −      + 
Art Gallery      +      − 
Airport       −      + 
Cathedral     −      + 
 
Figure 2. Examples of decision tasks between two cities based on six and three cues  
(e.g. State Capital). Positive / negative cue values are represented by the symbols + / −. 
 
A maximum likelihood analysis of the individual choice patterns (Bröder & Schiffer, 2003; 
Wasserman, 2000) and an additional analysis of decision time predictions (cf., Bergert & Nosof-
sky, 2007) were used to identify choice strategies.
1 In experiments with three and six cues (see 
Glöckner, 2007, for an overview), choice pattern suggested that the majority of participants used 
a weighted compensatory rule to integrate all cue values instead of a fast-and-frugal heuristic 
(Gigerenzer et al., 1999) such as Take the Best, Equal Weight or Random Choice. Even in the 
six cue decision tasks (Glöckner, 2007, Exp. 2b), the median decision time was below three sec-
onds. Thus, in line with the predictions of the PCS approach, most individuals were able to inte-
grate multiple pieces of information very quickly in a weighted compensatory manner.  
In all experiments, consistency was varied between decision tasks. An example for this manipu-
lation is presented in Figure 2 (right). For participants that estimated the cue "1
st League Soccer 
Team" as the least valid one, consistency was lower in the decision task depicted on the top than 
in the decision task below. According to fast-and-frugal heuristics (i.e., Take The Best), decision 
times should not differ between the two decision tasks because the number of computational 
steps that are necessary to select an option does not differ between these decision tasks. Accord-
ing to the PCS approach, in the upper decision task, decision time should be higher and confi-
dence judgments should be lower than in the decision task below. Both predictions could be sup-
ported empirically (Glöckner, 2006) and the findings were replicated using different decision 
tasks (including memory based decision task; Glöckner & Hodges, 2007) and different materials 
(Glöckner & Betsch, 2007).  
Finally, we investigated whether coherence shifts occur in city-size decision tasks (Glöckner, 
Betsch, & Schindler, 2007). After explaining the concept of cue validity and conditional likeli-
                                        
1   The latter is necessary because simple strategies like Take the Best and Equal Weight are always submodels 
of weighted compensatory strategies and thus can only be differentiated by using additional dependent vari-
ables (see also Lee & Cummins, 2004).   
     Wiesbaden       Freiburg 
State Capital    +    − 
University   −   + 
1
st League Soccer  −   +
      Dresden       Leverkusen 
State Capital    +    − 
University   +    − 
1
st League Soccer  −   +9 
hoods, in a pre-test participants were asked to judge the cue validity for a set of cues. Then indi-
viduals were instructed to reflect how they would decide in a certain city-size decision task (cf., 
Figure 2) without actually making a decision. Afterwards, they were asked to judge the same cue 
validities in a post-test (using the same format as the pre-test). In line with our hypotheses, we 
found clear coherence shifts (i.e., differences between ratings in the pre- and the post-test) for 
cue validities in the study.  
In sum, empirical evidence suggests that (a) decisions can be made rapidly, but can nevertheless 
be in line with weighted compensatory rules for information integration; (b) decision times in-
crease with an increase of the inconsistency in the decision situation (for similar results, see 
Cartwright & Festinger, 1943; Bergert & Nosofsky, 2007); and (c) confidence judgments de-
crease with increasing inconsistency.  
Thus, the results lend additional support to the view that consistency maximizing processes 
might play a central role in decision making, particularly in the process of information integra-
tion and structuring. Evidence concerning coherence shifts, choices, decision times and confi-
dence judgments corroborate the hypothesis that consistency maximizing processes automati-
cally operate towards consistent mental representations by holistically weighing information and 
accentuating the dominant structure in decision tasks.
2  
In the previous section we introduced a connectionist approach to decision making. It capitalizes 
on a PCS decision rule that processes information in parallel. We propose that this PCS rule is a 
fundamental principle of decision making and not just another strategy from the "heuristic tool-
box." Any new theory of decision making, however, has to be evaluated in the light of the wealth 
of findings on decision strategies (heuristics) and their application. In the next section, we briefly 
review the evidence on strategies in decision making and discuss some problems with the multi-
ple strategy view. Specifically, we doubt whether the evidence really allows for the conclusion 
that individuals employ different decision strategies. Rather, we claim that individuals employ 
different strategies of search and structuring of the problem space but still process this informa-
tion by an all-purpose decision strategy, the PCS-rule. Based on this assumption, we advance our 
PCS approach and put forward an integrative theoretical framework accounting for both deci-
sions among options and search strategies. 
Evaluating the Multiple Strategy Approach and a New Starting Point 
for Theorizing 
With the rise of a process view in the 1970’s, psychologists began to seek the strategies humans 
actually use in decision making. Soon, this quest yielded a rich harvest: the Lexicographic Rule 
                                        
2   The focus of the presented research was to test the model predictions against fast-and-frugal heuristics. Fur-
ther research will be needed to test distinct predictions concerning choice, decision time and confidence 
against other complex decision models which could, for  instance, also account for quick compensatory 
choices (e.g., Busemeyer & Townsend, 1993; Sloman & Hagmayer, 2006; Usher & McClelland, 2004).  10 
(LEX, Fishburn, 1974), Elimination by Aspects (EBA, Tversky, 1972), Satisficing (SAT, Simon, 
1955), the Majority of Confirming Dimensions Rule (Russo & Dosher, 1983) and the Equal 
Weight Rule (e.g., Dawes, 1998) are only the most prominent examples of decision strategies 
designed to avoid the complex calculations of a weighted additive rule – the compensatory ag-
gregation principle of utility theory (e.g., Payne et al., 1993, for an overview). However, the pur-
suit of such strategies has still not reached its climax. The hunting horns are blowing more loudly 
than ever (Gigerenzer, 2004), and more and more strategies are being crammed into the toolbox 
the decision maker is assumed to carry in his mind. Some of these new entries rely on potential 
correlates of value, such as affective reactions (Damasio, 1994; Slovic et al., 2002), majority be-
havior (Bohner et al., 1995), the expertise of communicators (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986), familiar-
ity (Tyszka, 1986) or recognition (Klein, 1993; Goldstein & Gigerenzer, 2002). Others, such as 
the Peak-and-End Heuristic (Kahneman et al., 1993) and the Priority Heuristic (Brandstätter et 
al., 2006), describe operations of the selective processing of values or reasons. 
Obviously, from a multiple strategy view, one has to deal with the problem of strategy selection. 
When does an individual apply a certain strategy? Models of strategy selection can be sorted into 
at least three categories according to the mechanism proposed for strategy selection: (i) decision, 
(ii) learning and (iii) context.  
The decision approach assumes that decision makers decide how to decide. Contingent upon the 
situation, strategy candidates are assessed in a meta-calculus, trading off costs (in terms of time 
and processing effort) and benefits (the expected accuracy achieved by application of a certain 
strategy). The strategy with the best balance is chosen. Therefore, the decision approach restores 
the notion of utility maximization on the super-ordinate level of strategy choice. Well known 
examples are models of contingent decision making (Beach & Mitchell, 1978) and adaptive 
strategy selection (Payne et al., 1988; 1993). The decision approach to strategy selection, how-
ever, obviously runs into problems. It initiates an infinite regress on the theoretical level (Betsch, 
1995; Payne, 1982). If we accept that individuals apply multiple strategies for behavioral deci-
sions, then why shouldn't they use these shortcuts on a higher level as well? Consequently, we 
may ask how people decide how to decide how to decide and so on – a chain of justification that 
can only be truncated arbitrarily. 
The learning approach assumes that strategy selection often functions in a bottom-up fashion 
(Payne & Bettman, 2001). By virtue of feedback learning, decision makers can acquire strategy 
routines (e.g., Bröder & Schiffer, 2006). These processes can be described in terms of reinforce-
ment learning (Rieskamp & Otto, 2006) or the formation of production rules (Pitz, 1977). Subse-
quently, the selection of strategies can be driven by the recognition of cues that signal the appro-
priateness of a strategy in recurring situations (cf., also the Recognition-Primed Decision Model 
by Klein, 1993; 1999). In light of the huge literature on problem solving and expertise (e.g., 
Frensch & Funke, 1995), such a view can hardly be questioned. Obviously, any theory of strat-
egy choice should address the role of learning. However, approaches that rely exclusively on 
learning and domain specificity will have a limited scope, because they cannot predict strategy 
selection in new situations.  11 
The context approach refrains from spelling out a mechanism for strategy selection. It concen-
trates on identifying crucial task and context factors that predict types of strategies rather than 
tokens. Prominent examples are the dual process models from attitude research, such as Fazio’s 
MODE model (Fazio, 1990) and the Elaboration Likelihood Model (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986). 
As a common denominator, these models posit that ability and motivation are key determinants 
for strategy selection. If cognitive abilities are constrained (e.g., due to time limits or distraction) 
and motivation is low, individuals will rely on low-effort decision-making heuristics or even 
automatic response rules. In contrast, a high degree of ability and high motivation will result in 
the application of strategies that involve a deeper elaboration of relevant information. Obviously, 
the problem with these models is the lack of precision. It is not possible to predict, say, when a 
non-compensatory or a compensatory search strategy will be applied. 
These different theoretical approaches coexist. None of them has been sufficiently elaborated 
and empirically tested to satisfactorily explain and predict the process of strategy and option se-
lection. Actually, we doubt whether any of the above approaches represents a promising starting 
point for solving the problem of strategy selection in the near future. Each of the models has 
shortcomings that are inherent in their theoretical line of thinking. Moreover, we claim that all of 
the above approaches suffer from a common sophism. Implicitly or explicitly, they take for 
granted that people really use different kinds of strategies for decision making. 
Decision strategies described in the literature indeed seem to be very different. The lexicographic 
rule (LEX), for instance, starts comparing options on the most important attribute and selects the 
option with the best value. It goes on without information integration and compensation. In con-
trast, the weighted additive rule (WADD) first integrates information within each option and 
then selects the option with the highest aggregated value. Moreover, decision making looks dif-
ferent if one considers process measures. All studies using an information board paradigm con-
verge by showing that patterns of information acquisition vary substantially, contingent upon 
task and context factors. The patterns of information search actually used by individuals map 
onto a number of decision strategies described in the literature, such as LEX and WADD. There 
is also evidence indicating that choices correspond with distinct types of strategies (for classifi-
cation methods based on a joint consideration of patterns of choices and/or process measures, see 
Bröder & Schiffer, 2003; Glöckner, 2006). Altogether, these findings seem to provide ample 
support for the notion that individuals apply different decision rules. 
With a closer look, however, the evidence is not conclusive. Researchers measure observable 
variables such as information search (e.g., movements in a matrix), choices and response laten-
cies. The decision itself – comprised of information integration and the application of a decision 
rule – cannot be directly observed. To make things even more complicated, different decision 
rules can produce similar outcomes. Moreover, based on different information, the same decision 
rule can produce different outcomes (Lee & Cummins, 2004). Consider, for example, an artifi-
cial system that is programmed to apply a single decision rule, say, "choose the alternative with 
the highest expected value." This rule will produce different choices in the same environment, 
depending on the amount and type of information that is fed into the system. If the input only 12 
contains information about the most important attribute, choices will converge with those made 
by applying a LEX rule (Lee & Cummins, 2004). However, it would be false to conclude from 
the observation of search and choice patterns that the system has applied a LEX rule in making 
its choice (cf., Bergert & Nosofsky, 2007). 
The distinction between strategies for search and strategies for decision is crucial. We interpret 
the results of process research as conclusive evidence for the view that people employ different 
strategies for information search. However, in line with other recent unifying decision ap-
proaches (Lee & Cummins, 2004; Newell, 2005), we doubt, that individuals actually use differ-
ent strategies for making preferential decisions. We start our theoretical contribution with the 
assumption that there is only one decision rule (rule for information integration and choice) for 
making all kinds of decisions. We further propose that this rule follows the PCS mechanism de-
scribed above. We assume that the underlying process operates automatically. In contrast, proc-
esses of information search, production and changing information are assumed to be primarily 
under deliberate control. The latter are open to introspection, can be verbalized and give the in-
dividual the feeling that he or she is deciding based on reasoning. However, most of the choices 
we make during a lifetime do not require processes of deliberate construction. 
Towards a PCS Framework for Option and Strategy Choice
3 
Decisions can occur without deliberate mental control. The core operations of the decision proc-
ess – information integration and the selection of a behavioral option – are often quickly per-
formed by the automatic system (Betsch, 2005; Glöckner, 2006). Earlier in this paper, we 
showed that these operations can be understood, described and modeled as a parallel constraint 
satisfaction process (PCS). We posit that PCS processes are instigated any time a preferential or 
probabilistic decision has to be made, regardless of whether the decision is primarily instantiated 
by situational or internal factors. We therefore consider the PCS rule an all-purpose mechanism 
for information integration and selection in decision making. 
The PCS rule holistically considers the information contained in a network. The network consists 
of all pieces of information that comprise the decision problem (cues, goals, options, evaluations, 
etc.). In many mundane situations, the constitution of the network does not require any sort of 
active information search. Salient features of the environment and currently activated memory 
entries provide the input to the network. As already noted, PCS processes set in at once and at-
tempt to find an option that serves the goals at stake. We refer to the network installed spontane-
ously when encountering a decision situation as the primary network (see Figure 3). All opera-
tions performed on the primary network are dedicated to successfully solving the decision prob-
lem by identifying the most promising choice option in the network. In the beginning, all deci-
sions are assumed to be option-centred. In contrast to models of contingent decision making 
                                        
3   The suggested framework elaborates on connectionist models for option choice put forward recently by the 
authors (Preference Theory: Betsch, 2005; Consistency Maximizing Approach: Glöckner, 2006).  13 
(e.g., Beach & Mitchell, 1978; Payne et al., 1988), we posit that the process of decision making 
does not start at the strategy level. In our framework, the term "option" refers to behavioral can-
didates for achieving the goals that constitute the decision problem represented in the primary 
network. In contrast, we use the term "strategy" for candidates contained in the secondary net-
work to be described below. Such strategies involve deliberate activities that are concerned with 
changing the primary network, for example, by active search and adding new information, by 
changing elements of the network (e.g., via inference and reinterpretation) or by changing the 
weights of the connections among nodes in the network. We refer to these processes as deliber-
ate constructions (DC).  
The next theoretical steps are straightforward. We have to (i) determine the conditions for initiat-
ing DC operations, (ii) describe the types of strategies in more detail and (iii) pin down the selec-
tion mechanism among them.   
Initiating DC Operations  
The PCS rule strives to find the most coherent or consistent solution to a decision problem by 
changing the activation level of the elements contained in the working network. The architecture 
of the network provides the constraints under which the quest for consistency evolves. Thus, the 
final level of consistency is bounded by the weights assigned to the connections between the 
elements of the network. If the level of consistency (C) exceeds a certain threshold (θ), PCS 
processes will be terminated and the option with the highest activation will be chosen. Under 
these conditions, DC operations are not necessary to solve a decision problem. 
Under which conditions are DCs required for arriving at a decision? We seek to identify an en-
dogenous factor, without thereby claiming that exogenous factors are irrelevant. The consistency 
in the primary network is one such endogenous factor. We assume that if the level of consistency 
falls short of the threshold (C < θ, see Figure 3), then this is a sufficient condition for initiating 
DC operations. At this moment, a secondary network is created and an appropriate DC strategy 
will be chosen and implemented.
4 It is important to note that the resulting DC operations will not 
directly lead to a choice from among the behavioral options. They only serve to help the primary 
network reach an acceptable level of consistency so that the decision rule (choose the option with 
the highest activation) can be applied. In other words, strategies of DC operations do not substi-
tute the PCS rule for information integration and choice.  
Thus, the two networks serve different functions. The job of the primary network is to make the 
behavioral decision (i.e., to select an option). In many routine decision situations, PCS process-
ing will immediately find a coherent pattern of activations and, thus, can detect the option to be 
chosen. Decision making, under such conditions, can be guided by automatic processes only.  
                                        
4   For a related discussion on solving complex decision tasks by two interacting network models and the im-
plementation of sequential thought processes in parallel distributed processing models see Rumelhart, 
Smolensky, McClelland, and Hinton (1986).  14 
The secondary network functions as an aiding system in order to help the primary network do its 
job. It selects strategies that help to restructure the primary network, or, if the primary network is 
empty (e.g., because no relevant information is accessible or salient in the environment), to form 
the network (e.g., by opening boxes in a mouselab). Note that the secondary network impacts 
option decisions in an indirect fashion by providing or changing information. Nevertheless, deci-
sions are also made in the secondary network. These are made, however, among strategies of 
search, information generation and change. Apart from their different functions, the two net-
works obey the same principles of consistency maximizing. 
Concerning the quality of the resulting decisions, it has to be noted that a high level of consis-
tency within the primary network is not a measure of the quality (or rationality) of a decision per 
se. Decisions can be based on highly consistent mental representations and may nevertheless be 
dead wrong. One major reason for this could be that the primary network is not tuned to the envi-
ronment and thus does not accurately represent the structure of the decision task (Glöckner, in 
press). In probabilistic inferences like the city-size decisions described above, the level of consis-
tency that is finally reached in the primary network reflects to a certain extent the likelihood that 
one option is better on the distal criterion than the other(s). Similarly, in legal cases the consis-
tency of different possible interpretations of the evidence is related to the likelihood of these in-
terpretations (cf., Thagard, 2003). In preference decisions (which we have not touched in the dis-
cussion so far) the level of consistency reflects the profitability of different options according to 
the considered goals or attributes. Networks consist of options and goals (the latter replacing the 
cue nodes) and the option which is most consistent with the considered goals (and which is thus 




Figure 3. An integrative PCS model for the selection of options (primary network)  

















The threshold of the acceptable level of consistency (C) is not considered a constant. This level 
may be adjusted, conditional upon personal, contextual and task-related factors. For instance, 
decision makers may lower the threshold level if time constraints increase. They may elevate the 
level if the decision is highly relevant for them or someone else. A more thorough discussion of 
moderating factors is provided by Betsch (2005).  
Note that the PCS rule shares the general idea of a certain level of confidence which has to be 
reached to make a decision with decision field theory (Busemeyer & Townsend, 1993) and other 
evidence-accumulation models (e.g., Lee & Cummins, 2004; Usher & McClelland, 2004). In 
evidence-accumulation models, pieces of information for different options are added up in a se-
rial manner until one option is sufficiently better than the other(s) so that this option can be se-
lected. Although there are conceptual similarities, the PCS rule postulates a completely different 
process, which is based on the idea that information is considered in its complex constellation 
and is not serially added up. Whereas evidence-accumulation models stick with the idea that 
pieces of information are merely used to infer a choice in a unidirectional manner, the PCS rule 
postulates a hermeneutic reasoning process in which pieces of information and options are 
evaluated and interpreted in a bidirectional manner (Holyoak & Simon, 1999).
5 
Types of DC Strategies 
The choice alternatives contained in the secondary network are strategies for searching, produc-
ing or changing information. "Search for information in the environment according to the impor-
tance of cues across options" or "consider all the outcomes of an option before considering a fur-
ther option" are examples of search strategies. Note that the former conforms to non-
compensatory search strategies and the latter to compensatory ones. Production strategies refer to 
both rehearsal strategies for accessing information from memory and rules of inference and de-
duction. The latter may help to anticipate the risk of future events (e.g., if a firm has performed 
extremely well on the stock market during the past years and the Dow Jones index has reached a 
climax, then it is likely that the stocks of this firm will fall in the next months). Strategies of in-
formation change involve a reinterpretation of the relations among goals, options and behaviors. 
A routine decision maker might realize that the world has changed and that the routine option no 
longer promotes his or her goals. Due to the prior success of the routine, the connection between 
the goals and the behavior are positive. By virtue of active mental control, the decision maker 
may adapt the weights temporarily (a lasting change can only be achieved via associative learn-
ing, cf., Betsch et al., 2004; Betsch, 2005).  
                                        
5   The leaky competing accumulator (LCA) model of perceptual choice by Usher and McClelland (2004) is an 
advancement of evidence accumulation models that bears the highest resemblance to our model in that it pos-
tulates a non-linear activation function, a leakage of activation (i.e., decay) and a mutual inhibition between 
option nodes. Note, however, that in the LCA there are no backward connections from option nodes to the 
input preprocessing nodes so that the model cannot easily account for the findings concerning coherence 
shifts and hermeneutic reasoning. Another obvious distinction is that the LCA does not aim to model both 
automatic and deliberate processes at the same time. Further research will be required to derive and test dis-
tinct predictions of the LCA and the PCS rule. 16 
Like options on the behavioral level, DC strategies can be learned and become routinized 
(Bröder & Schiffer, 2006). Over the course of their lifetime, deciders will eventually accumulate 
a set of DC routines that suit specific types of decision situations. These routines need not be 
learned via first-hand experience. They can also be handed down via communication and instruc-
tion. For instance, we teach our MA and PhD students to use the PsycINFO search engine before 
deciding which line of research they should pursue further.  
In new situations, deciders may remain focussed on generalized strategies for information pro-
duction. Although this varies among individuals, these generalized strategies may remain com-
paratively stable within a person. They manifest themselves in individual differences regarding 
the scrutiny, the focus of attention and the direction in which a person considers information. 
Some people generally prefer to consider a larger amount of information and to explore the prob-
lem space more thoroughly than others. These people score high on pertinent inventories such as 
the Maximizing Scale (Greifeneder & Betsch, 2006; Schwartz et al., 2002) and the Need for 
Cognition Scale (Cacioppo & Petty, 1982). There is also evidence that individuals differ with 
regard to the type of information they primarily focus on when making a decision. For example, 
some people prefer to focus on the experiential or affective level, whereas others are more re-
sponsive to the noetic or cognitive level of information (C. Betsch, 2004). Differences in reading 
direction may be especially manifested when information is presented graphically or in written 
form. One can speculate, for example, about whether search movements in an information board 
(e.g., the mouselab) might systematically vary across cultures in accordance with differences in 
the direction of reading. Moreover, information search may generally be biased towards the con-
firmation rather than disconfirmation of a starting hypothesis (e.g., Wason, 1960). If individuals 
start with the hypothesis that option A might be better than option B (e.g., due to the fact that A 
performed well in the past), they might reveal a tendency to search for evidence that favors A or 
challenges B (e.g., Betsch, Haberstroh et al., 2001). 
Selection among DC Strategies 
We propose that decision making among DC strategies follows the same principle as decision 
making among choice options. As a general purpose mechanism for decision making, the PCS 
rule will also serve the secondary network. The goals contained in this network are instrumental 
to the primary decision problem. The main goal is to help the primary network to find a solution, 
which means that the utility of a strategy depends on the extent to which it helps establish consis-
tency in the primary network. Other goals relating to accuracy and effort complement the moti-
vational part of the secondary network. Again, the content and structure of the network are 
strongly determined by prior experience and learning. Needless to say, such a view can easily 
incorporate the notion of strategy routines (Bröder & Schiffer, 2006; Rieskamp & Otto, 2006). 
The nature of processing information in the primary and the secondary network are identical. 
The only difference is that the secondary network serves the primary network. Specifically, we 
assume that after a DC candidate is chosen and implemented, the output of these operations (e.g., 17 
new information) is fed into the primary network. Secondary processes (network formation, im-
plementation of DC operations) will operate until an acceptable level of consistency is installed 
in the primary network (Figure 3).  
Modeling Information Search and Choice within the PCS Framework 
The PCS model posits that preferential decision making starts with the attempt to make a deci-
sion on the subordinate level (i.e., selecting an option that serves the goals constituting the deci-
sion problem). As such, our framework differs from those accounts that claim that the process of 
decision making starts with a decision among strategies on the superordinate level (e.g., the con-
tingency model: Beach & Mitchell, 1978; the effort accuracy framework: Payne & Bettman, 
2001; SSL: Rieskamp & Otto, 2006). In many if not most of the choices we make during a life-
time, deliberate processes of search, production and the change of information are not necessary 
to discover a consistent solution to a decision problem. In contrast, laboratory settings usually 
create conditions that are not representative of mundane decisions in that they hamper the forma-
tion of a primary network. Consider, for example, the mouselab, an often-used tool to study in-
formation search in decision making (e.g., Payne et al., 1988; cf., Glöckner & Betsch, 2007 for a 
discussion of this method). In the mouselab, the individual is unfamiliar with the options and all 
the relevant information is hidden in a covered matrix. Hence, the primary network is nearly 
empty (it still contains goals and representations of the decision problem). Such experimental 
conditions do not merely invite processes of DC operations; rather, they are a precondition for 
making a decision. As such, the secondary network will be formed immediately upon encounter-
ing the task, and the individual will first decide how to gather or produce information.  
Context sensitivity is a major feature of the PCS model. The formation of a working network is 
conceived as an automatic process, which is not selective with regard to the relevance of the in-
formation provided. Whenever a decision problem is encountered, all salient aspects of the envi-
ronment and currently accessible information from memory feed into the working network (cf., 
Figure 3). Deliberation is not a necessary condition for starting decision making. Primary net-
work formation at an early stage can be considered a process of passive contextualization. It 
seizes the given and is blind to the unstated (processes of DC can help to remedy this problem, 
but recall that they are optional). Any piece of information encoded in the environment or acti-
vated from memory, whether it is objectively relevant or not, will be considered as long as it can 
be tied into the network (this primarily depends on prior associative learning). Many of the ob-
served violations of the axioms of utility theory have to do with the impact of objectively irrele-
vant information (e.g., framing, Tversky & Kahneman, 1981). From the viewpoint of our theory, 
context dependency either in its negative (violation of invariance principle) or in its positive 
form (adapting to changing contexts) is an inevitable consequence of the automatic processes 
guiding the initial representation of the decision problem.  
The model explicitly adopts a learning perspective on human decision making. Accordingly, de-
cisions are embedded in a stream of behavioral experiences, and choices are conceived as having 18 
a past and future (Betsch & Haberstroh, 2005). On the theoretical level, past experiences mani-
fest themselves in the structure of weights in the network reflecting prior associated learning. 
Future experiences will provide the decision maker with feedback. In technical terms, feedback 
can cause lasting changes to the weights of associations. One consequence of feedback learning 
is that individuals establish a repertoire of routines both on the level of options (e.g. Betsch, 
Haberstroh et al., 2001; Betsch et al., 2004) and on the level of DC strategies (e.g., search rou-
tines, Bröder & Schiffer, 2006). Betsch (2005) provides a detailed discussion on how these ef-
fects can be accounted for within a PCS approach.  
Summary 
We have outlined the fundamentals of a PCS framework for option and strategy choice. The 
framework starts with the notion that there are different building blocks for information search 
and production, but there is only one mechanism for information integration and choice. This 
mechanism is described in terms of a PCS process that is able to work automatically. Processes 
of deliberation in decision making are mainly concerned with actively constructing the problem 
space. Major processes are the search for information, the production of information via infer-
ence and temporary changes of pre-established knowledge. Both the automatic and the deliberate 
operations are important for adaptive decision making. We tied them together in an integrative 
framework. Strategies in this framework are not strategies of decision making but strategies of 
search, editing and changing information. In a nutshell, these strategies are behaviors and indi-
viduals are assumed to select among them in the same manner as they select among all sort of 
behaviors - by applying their all-purpose PCS rule of decision making.  19 
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